Have you ever wondered how to evaluate the moral value of a world population? Population ethics poses mind-boggling questions, one of them being the "Mere Addition Paradox" leading to what philosopher Derek Parfit termed as the 'Repugnant Conclusion'.

Imagine a world, say World A, filled with a billion people all leading extremely happy lives. Now imagine a world, World A+, identical to World A but with an extra billion people who live lives barely worth living but aren't suffering either. One could argue World A+ is at least not worse than World A because it contains all the happy lives of World A, plus extra lives that, while not nearly as joyful, are still mildly positive. This is the principle of mere addition, adding more people on to an existing population without decreasing anyone's happiness.

Now, think about World A++, a world with two billion people all living moderately happy lives, none of them living a life merely worth living. Following the same logic, this world isn't worse than World A+. In fact, one might reason that it's better as everyone lives a happier life even though their lives are less happy compared to the billion people in World A.

But here's the repellent part, the Repugnant Conclusion: following these steps, it seems we could be led to argue that a vastly populated world of people living barely enjoyable lives could be morally superior to a smaller world with fewer people living extraordinarily happy lives. Most find this conclusion disturbingly counter-intuitive, standing at odds with the principle of mere addition.

This paradox showcases the complexities and difficulties in balancing quantity and quality of life within population ethics. Can we really compare and rank different population sizes and happiness levels? Is there a line that divides morally acceptable from repugnant? These are profoundly philosophical questions that remain actively debated today, symbolizing the paradoxical nature of moral and ethical judgments.

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