While many Latin American states have experienced severe public-safety crises in the context of fiscal duress, elite engagement in state building has taken place in some countries but not in others. Why is that the case?In explaining the adoption of elite taxes for public safety, Gustavo Flores-Macías argues that the conventional crisis-centered explanations are insufficient. Whereas economic elites are generally reluctant to shoulder a greater tax burden, public-safety crises can soften this opposition – when they affect elites directly – and thereby open the door to negotiations with the government. However, the deterioration of public-safety conditions is not enough to elicit elite taxation. Rather, the resulting tax arrangement will depend on the strength of business–government linkages in the form of formal and informal collaboration mechanisms. When linkages are weak, elite taxation is likely to fail, if attempted at all. Stronger linkages will make elite taxation more likely.Gustavo Flores-Macías is a Professor of Government and Public Policy and Associate Vice Provost for International Affairs at Cornell University. His latest book is Contemporary State Building: Elite Taxation and Public Safety in Latin America. Twitter @Gustavo_F_M Key highlights Introduction - 00:52Contemporary state building in Latin America - 04.00Economic elites in Latin America – 12.34Elites as an obstacle to state building - 19.04Determinants of fiscal reforms and elite taxation - 25.46Differentiation of public safety from other public goods - 34.50Taxing elites, the El Salvador case - 46.50How to mobilise security tax for development and welfare – 52.26Host:Professor Dan Banik, University of Oslo, Twitter: @danbanik  @GlobalDevPodApple Google Spotify YouTubehttps://in-pursuit-of-development.simplecast.com/
Host:Dan Banik LinkedInX: @danbanik @GlobalDevPod Subscribe:Apple Spotify YouTubehttps://in-pursuit-of-development.simplecast.com

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